The Doctrine of Double Speak uh I mean Effect

One of the recurring themes in RP theology is doctrines that are created to answer a specific question, but then get turned into a lens through which all things must be judged. Or maybe all things that we don't like get judged through that lens and the things we don't want to question are never to be questioned.

As an example, the "Regulative Principle of Worship" sounds good and simple - we don't do stuff in worship without a clear scriptural warrant (command or example). So, having mid-service announcements, or a mission update or something that isn't cool like that gets kicked out. It was originally, in my understanding, used to question the idolization of the communion elements (the host) in Catholic services. But, if you ask an RP pastor why we baptize people in worship, when there is neither command, nor example, nor even necessary consequence, they will end the conversation in record time. Remember that Hebrew infants were circumcised "on the eighth day", so no example there, and NT baptisms occurred immediately on profession of faith, without any indication that the congregation had to be gathered or even that it was done in a worship service.

So, it's not surprising that RP leaders would dredge up another woefully inadequate doctrine to nitpick reproductive health. This time, the Doctrine of Double Effect. Thomas Aquinas is supposedly the first theologian who argues this, in Summa Theologiae - I use https://aquinasonline.com/double-effect/ as the source of the discussion of the original.

Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. … Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is the saving of one’s life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor. Therefore this act, since one’s intention is to save one’s own life, is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to everything to keep itself in “being,” as far as possible. And yet, though proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out of proportion to the end. Wherefore if a man, in self-defense, uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he repel force with moderation his defense will be lawful. (ST II-II 64,7)

The original statement seems pretty reasonable. I can take an action that has a bad effect, as long as my intent is good, and the bad effect does not outweigh the good effect. But, as with other things, the devil is in the details. The action becomes the object of scrutiny. The article above continues:

1. One may only intend a good or morally neutral action. One may never intend an intrinsically evil action, an action that is inherently evil. Intrinsically or inherently evil acts have an object which is disordered, i.e., which reason recognized as opposed or thwarting some human good. Some examples intrinsically evil actions are lying, fornication, adultery, murder (intentionally, directly killing another human being), suicide.

2. The good action, or at least a morally neutral action, that one does intend has two effects: a good effect which one intends to achieve, and an evil side-effect, which one does not intend (even though it may be foreseen), but which is tolerated.

3. The evil effect cannot be the means of achieving the good effect, for this would be equivalent of intending evil to bring about good, and so go against Romans 3:8.

4. There must be proportionality between the good intended and the evil tolerated. The good to be achieved must outweigh the evil tolerated; one cannot allow significant evil effects for a trivial reason.

Unfortunately, the codification of the rule (which has persisted, like the codification of the Regulative Principle of Worship) ends up destroying the original argument.

Aquinas says very little about the action itself, other than the intent, but the Aquinas scholars start gatekeeping the action. "Good or morally neutral action". The problem here is that killing is not, in and of itself, a morally neutral action. Aquinas doesn't weigh in on the morality of the action itself, but on the intent and the balance. If killing someone is necessary to save a life, and the saving of the life is a better outcome than the loss of life, then the action of killing someone is justified.

To give a better example of this, a topic I remember coming up a lot is the Surprise Party paradox. Maybe paradox isn't the best word. But here's what Geneva Freshmen discuss at the lunch table. Let's say your roommate has a birthday coming up and you want to throw them a surprise party. At what point are you breaking God's law? What if you say that you're going to take them to a movie, but you're really not going to take them to a movie. Maybe you can plan to take them to a movie a few days later and now you're not lying. But, what (horrors!) if your roommate asks you point blank, ARE YOU PLANNING A SURPRISE PARTY? Now you must choose between obedience to God (telling your roommate the truth) or the fun, that you think your roommate will enjoy, of being surprised and celebrated?

The debate, like the Aquinas scholars, turns into gatekeeping the action. Lying is NEVER permissible, therefore, telling your roommate that you're not planning a surprise party is sinful, even though the INTENT of telling your roommate a lie is something you believe to be the greater good - a well-executed surprise party that they will enjoy much more than realizing they were lied to.

This is where it becomes unhinged. For example, people erroneously believe that an undercover cop is morally required to admit to being a cop if asked directly, "are you a cop?". Christians would then have difficulty with being a spy "are you a spy?" Soldiers would have difficulty - "can I bomb a city knowing there will be civilians killed", or even "should I try to kill this enemy soldier if I could incapacitate him by shooting both his kneecaps?"

I think this is why Aquinas avoided nitpicking the action itself and focused on the intended and unintended consequences. Even killing is okay if the intended consequence (saving life) outweighs the unintended consequence (killing an aggressor).

Why does this matter?

The RP church appointed a study committee to decide on a revision of the RP Testimony from the current "Deliberately induced abortion, except possibly to save the mother’s life, is murder." to "Deliberately induced abortion is murder."

The study committee rationalized this using the "Doctrine of Double Effect" to pontificate that the ACTION of a chemical abortion, even if an abortion is required to save the life of the mother, and the baby has no chance of survival, is murder. So, again, gatekeeping the action itself, the action of abortion is never permissible, under any circumstances. Instead mothers who have an ectopic pregnancy must have their fallopian tube removed (a "morally neutral action"), even if the consequence is reduced fertility and the death of the unborn child, because chemical abortion cannot be morally neutral.

So, in doing this, the RP church (as they often do) ruled broadly on an extremely narrow case, in order to victimize and harm women, but as a consequence have made all sorts of things immoral.

1. Self-defense is now immoral. Harming or killing someone cannot be a morally neutral, thus self-defense is sinful. The intent of saving life doesn't matter because the action of killing a person is not morally neutral.
2. The death penalty is now immoral for the same reasons, even though it seems God commands it.
3. Spying is immoral
4. Amputation is immoral - the act of cutting someone's limb off is not in itself morally neutral even if it is done for the intent of saving the person's life

It becomes completely wacko when we judge the action itself. I believe Aquinas is right - if my intent is to do good and my action is measured to not cause unnecessary harm, and the good outcome outweighs the "unintended but expected" consequence (Aquinas waffles that I can kill a person without the intent of killing a person. Yuck!) then it is morally permissible.

With that said, by Aquinas's reasoning, killing an unborn child with the intent of saving the mother's life is morally permissible, even if the action I take would not be morally neutral in other circumstances.

In the same vein, lying to my roommate, which would generally be sinful, can be morally permissible when the intent is for a greater good (unexpected joy and celebration).

In the same way, lying to the Nazi guards about housing Jews is morally permissible because the good consequence (saving innocent life) outweighs what would otherwise be sinful (lying to lawful authority).

So, the Aquinas scholars (and current RP leaders) miss Aquinas's point altogether. The action itself is sinful in most circumstances. There's no getting around that, that this doctrine is the exception rather than the rule. It's sinful to lie, EXCEPT... It's sinful to kill, EXCEPT... Instead they turn it into this legalistic checkbox where we try to fool God. "I didn't INTEND to kill the baby, but I removed the fallopian tube and the baby just happened to die." (Is God fooled by this?) "I didn't INTEND to kill civilians, but I dropped a bomb on an industrial facility at 9AM that was producing drones so that the workers would be incapacitated"  (Again, is God fooled?) "I didn't intend to poke my mugger's eyes out to stop him from attacking me, but, yes, I took my car keys and hit him in the eye."

If killing an unborn baby to save the life of the mother is immoral, is God really going to look away because you took out the fallopian tube instead of cutting the baby out, or taking a drug to kill the baby?